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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

VII. PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Few important constitutional issues came before the Illinois

courts during the period covered by this survey and the federal
courts considered only one case from this state involving a constitutional problem. The advocates of reapportionment made
another attempt to enlist judicial assistance in their cause. As
usual, the effort was futile. A complaint under the federal
Declaratory Judgment Act was filed in Colegrove v. Green' in the
District Court seeking a decree declaring the act apportioning
Illinois into congressional districts invalid and asking an injunction to restrain the governor, the secretary of state and the state
auditor, as the Illinois Primary Certifying Board, from taking
proceedings for the November election. The district court dismissed the complaint. That decision was affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court,2 in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, reiterating the familiar characterization that the
controversy was political in character and that the courts had
nothing to do with its determination. In holding that there was
want of equity in the complaint, the majority opinion stated: "The
duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed cannot be
brought under judicial compulsion. "3
A few other cases involving decisions on constitutional questions are worthy of mention. The decision in People ex rel. Sanitary District of Chicago v. Schlaeger4 upheld the constitutionality
of the 1933 amendment to the Australian Ballot Act.5 In substance, the amendment provides for the sharing of the costs of
printing and delivery of ballots and the compensation of judges
* Investigation discloses no cases worthy of comment dealing with aspects of
Administrative Law within the scope of this survey except that of Northwestern
Institute of Foot Surgery v. Thompson, 326 Ill. App. 439, 62 N. E. (2d) 42 (1945),
which was included in last year's report:

24 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 67.

1 64 F. Supp. 632 (1946).
2 Colegrove v. Green, 326 U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 1242 (1946).
3 326 U. S. - at -, 66 S. Ct. 1196 at 1201, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 1242 at 1245.
4 391 Ill. 314, 63 N. E. (2d) 382 (1945).
5 Laws 1933, p. 578; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 46, §§ 16-2 and 13-11.
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and clerks of election where the names of candidates for offices of
municipalities, townships, park districts, school districts or sanitary districts, the territorial limits of which are less than the
territorial limits of a county, appear upon the same ballot with
those of candidates for county offices at a general election. It was
argued that the staiute was invalid because it created a debt
equivalent to levying a tax for local purposes in violation of Sections 9 and 10 of Article IX of the state constitution. The court
held that funds applied to defray part of the cost of holding
general elections were applied to the payment of general governmental expenses. In People ex rel. Currenv. Schomlmer 6 the court
upheld the constitutionality of the act creating the Illinois State
Super-Highway Commission;7 deciding that tolls to be charged
are to be regarded not as taxes but as compensation for the use of
property. The court also considered the power of the commission
to borrow money and decided that, under the proper interpretation
of the act, such power was limited to borrowing for repayment
out of tolls and fees to be collected.
CONFLICT OF LAWS

The Illinois Supreme Court considered generally the effect to
-be given the judgments and decrees of courts of other states,
under the full faith and credit clause, in the case of People ex rel.
Jones v. Chicago Lloyds.8 In that case, a suit was begun in 1934
in Missouri against an unincorporated association engaged in the
insurance business to recover damages for malicious prosecution
and false arrest. In 1938, while this action was pending, liquidation proceedings were instituted against the association in Illinois
and a decree was entered appointing a liquidator and vesting him
with possession of the association's property. The liquidator
directed the association's counsel not to participate further in the
Missouri proceeding. In 1941, the Missouri court entered judgment in the tort case. The judgment was presented as a claim in
6392 Il. 17, 63 N. E. (2d) 744 (1945).
7 In. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121, § 314a et seq.
8 391 Iln. 492, 63 N. E. (2d) 479 (1945), noted in 46 Col. L. Rev. 479.
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the liquidation proceedings and was disallowed. On appeal, the
Supreme Court applied the familiar rule that the full faith and
credit clause does not require a state to recognize the judgment
of a sister state obtained subsequent to a decree transferring the
property of the judgment debtor to a trustee or other officer for
the benefit of all creditors. In the instant case, the court further
held that the Missouri judgment, considered in the light of a claim,
gave the judgment creditor no rights in the liquidation proceedings.
Only one other case dealing with a problem of conflict of laws
need be mentioned here. In Lubin v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of United States,9 nineteen separate plaintiffs filed separate suits in equity against nineteen mutual life insurance companies praying for an accounting and distribution of undistributed
surplus funds. All of such insurance companies were organized
in states other than Illinois. Separate appeals from orders dismissing the complaints were consolidated for hearing before the
Appellate Court. That court followed the established practice of
refusing to take jurisdiction to regulate the internal affairs of
foreign corporations, saying: "In view of the fact that the law
governing every aspect and phase of the theory of plaintiffs'
complaints had been long and well established prior to the filing
of said complaints, we are constrained to believe that the nineteen
suits involved herein were instituted solely for what possible
nuisance value they might prove to have."1 0
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS

A large number of cases, some of which may have far-reaching
consequences, were passed upon in the field of municipal law. They
dealt with a wide variety of topics. Thus, in Woodruff v. City of
Chicago," it was held that an abutting property owner could not
recover the amount he had paid on a special assessment for widen9 326 Ill.App. 358, 61 N. E. (2d) 753 (1945).
10326 Ill. App. 358 at 376, 61 N. E. (2d) 753 at 760.
11326 Ill.
App. 577, 63 N. E. (2d) 124 (1945). The Supreme Court granted leave
to appeal and, In 394 Ill.542, 69 N. E. (2d) 287 (194). not in the period of this
survey, reversed the Appellate Court in part.
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ing and improving a street since the evidence did not show that
the city had abandoned the project even though it had been long
delayed. The court suggested that the plaintiff's remedy, if any
existed for failure to complete the improvement, was in an action
for damages.
An interesting case concerning the liability of a city on the
theory of quantum meruit for services rendered may be found in
DeLeuw, Cather & Company v. City of Joliet.'2 The city there
concerned intended to use-federal funds for the erection of a new
municipal waterworks system and engaged plaintiff's services for
certain preliminary work in connection therewith. The federal
grant failed, the project was abandoned, and plaintiff then sued
for the value of its serevices. The court held that no prior appropriation was necessary to make the contract binding as it was not
contemplated that payment was to be made from general funds.
As the federal funds were never made available and as no bonds
were issued, one can only speculate as to where the funds to pay
the judgment are to come from if not from the general fund. If
the case is to be followed, it would seem that earlier rules applied
13
in this state have been overruled.
In the case of Village of Westchester v. Holmes, 14 the Supreme
Court squarely held that the extension and refunding of special
assessment bonds pursuant to the Local Improvement Act 5 was
properly refused where much of the property had been sold on
foreclosure proceedings for delinquency in the payment of general
taxes and special assessments. The court pointed out that as the
liens of general taxes and special assessments are of equal dignity,
if refunding of the special assessments was allowed, the lien for
general taxes, which cannot be refunded, would be greatly diluted
and prejudiced. The court seemed anxious not to jeopardize the
rights of buyers at the tax foreclosure sale.
327 IlI. App. 453, 64 N. E. (2d) 779 (1946). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 Another case which reaches a similar result but by a different route may be
observed in Welsbach Traffic Signal Co. v. City of Chicago, 328 I1. App. 467, 66
K. H. (2d) 471 (1946).
24 390 Ill. 436, 62 N. E. (2d) 410 (1945).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 84--86a.
12
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The right of a de jure civil service employee to recover his
full salary, accruing in the interim between the issuance of a
peremptory writ of mandamus and the time when the same was
affirmed on appeal, was firmly established in' Corbett v. City of
Chicago.16 The court expressly rejected the contention of the city
that payment of the salary to a de facto employee, made in good
faith, constituted a defense.
The constitutionality of the act providing for airports in
parks 1 7 was upheld in People ex rel. Ammann v. Wabash Railroad
Company's wherein the railroad questioned the legality of a
Decatur park district tax levy for airport expense. The court, in
a lengthy opinion, upheld the act by stating, in substance, that the
act specifically granted the power to the municipal corporation,
was for a proper corporate purpose and, no abuse or unreasonableness as to the exercise of the power having been shown, it was a
proper delegation of a legislative power. The argument of the
railroad was more in the nature of an indictment of the General
Assembly for permitting so many different municipal bodies to
have authority to acquire and operate airports. Another important case on the same general subject was presented in People
ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 19 a decision which upheld the Municipal
Airport Authorities Act 20 against a number of constitutional
objections which had been levelled against it. One objection, most
vigorously pressed, was that the act was for the furtherance of
private purposes since rental would be charged to private interests
using the airport facilities. The court pointed out that the public
interest lay in the fact that such "airports have been characterized
as the 'highways of the air.' ,121 Mention might also be made of
the action of the General Assembly in passing the Airport Zoning
Act,2 2 a statute which empowers the Department of Aeronautics
16391 Ill. 96, 62 N. E. (2d) 693 (1945), affirming 323 Ill. App. 429, 55 N. E. (2d)
717 (1944), noted in 23 CHIAGO-KENT LAw REVIIw 268.
17 Laws 1929, p. 557; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 105, § 327b et seq.
is391 Ill. 200, 62 N. E. (2d) 819 (1945).
19 391 Ill. 237, 62 N. B. (2d) 809 (1945).
20 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 1512, §§ 68.1 to 68.20.
21 An earlier statute had been held invalid in People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf,
388 Ill. 445, 58 N. E. (2d) 172 (1944).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 15
, § 48.1 et seq.
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and municipal subdivisions of the state to exercise zoning powers
in order to prevent airport hazards, thereby aiding aerial navigation.
The old problem as to the liability of a municipality on bonds
issued to satisfy indebtedness, other than corporate, was again
raised in the case of Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company v.
Calunet City.23 The action was one in equity to enjoin the defendant municipality and its officers from issuing bonds to retire
certain judgments against the city, which judgments had been
rendered in certain actions based on local improvement bonds and
which might have been prevented had the suits been more vigorously contested. Plaintiff's position was that payment of such
judgments was not a proper corporate purpose. The court held
that inasmuch as there was no fraud shown in connection with the
procurement of the earlier judgments, such judgments had become
valid obligations which could be retired by a bond issue. To arrive
at that result, the court was obliged to distinguish its holding from
that in Leviton v. Board of Education24 which had indicated that
an improper expenditure does not become a proper one merely
because it comes robed in the form of a judgment. It attempted
a distinction on the ground that a school district, "being a quasimunicipal corporation, cannot be held liable for the shortcomings
of its officials. ' 25 There is some difficulty in seeing why that
distinction should be of controlling importance. Much the same
rationale, however, seems to have been followed in Edward J.
Berwind, Inc. v. Chicago Park District26 where the court held that
the municipal corporation was liable for the acts of the park commissioners in diverting funds collected for the retirement of tax
27
anticipation warrants.
The extent of the licensing powers of a municipality was
391 Iii. 280, 63 N. E. (2d) 369 (1945).
374 Il. 594, 30 N. E. (2d) 497 (1940)'.
25391 11. 280 at 293, 63 N. E. (2d) 369 at 375.
26 393 Ill. 317, 65 N. E. (2d) 785 (1946).
27 The court again sought to distinguish its decision from the holdings in Berman
v. Board of Education, 360 Ill. 535, 196 N. E. 464 (1935), and a number of other
eases listed in 393 Ill. 317 at 337, also dealing with the diversion of funds. Can it
be that the Illinois Supreme Court is seeking to modify its earlier decisions to some
extent ?
23

24
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involved in three cases. In Lamere v. City of Chicago,28 the court
was asked to construe Section 23-54 of the Cities and Villages
Act which expressly authorizes municipalities to license "theatricals and other exhibitions, shows and amusements. "29 An ordinance enacted pursuant thereto required that all automatic musical
instruments and "juke" boxes be licensed. It also established an
annual license fee of $50 for each instrument. The Supreme Court,
on direct appeal, 30 held the ordinance to be a regulatory, as
opposed to a revenue, measure, but as the fee was regarded as
excessive the ordinance was declared invalid. The second licensing
case, that of City of Bloomington v. Ramey, 31 involved the same
section but there the ordinance required that a license be obtained
by all itinerant merchants and provided for a graduated license
fee, commencing with a $50 minimum. Again, the court held that
the ordinance was a licensing and not a taxing one but considered
the amount charged was unnecessarily burdensome and bore no
general relation to the burden of regulation. The third case involved two ordinances of the City of Chicago 32 which purported
to regulate and license "Homes" and "Nursing Homes." Both
ordinances were held valid in FatherBasil's Lodge, Inc. v. City of
Chicago,3 3 even though the city admitted that no express power
had been delegated. It did, however, contend that several sections
of the Cities and Villages Act, giving the power to pass ordinances
for the health and safety bf the residents, 4 were sufficient for the
purpose. The Supreme Court agreed, pointing out that care for
the health and safety of the inhabitants was an important police
power, particularly when directed toward the safety of inmates
of institutions.
391 Ill. 552, 63 N. E. (2d) 863 (1945).
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 23-54.
30 In County of Winnebago v. Harrington, 391 Ill. 267, 63 N. E. (2d) 6 (1945),
however, direct appeal to the Supreme Court in a case involving the constitutionality of a county zoning ordinance was denied when the court considered
such an ordinance as not being within the meaning of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch.
28

29 Ii1.

no, § 199.
31393 Ill. 467, 66 N. E. (2d)

385 (1946).
Municipal Code, Chicago, Ch. 136 and Ch. 136.1.
33 393 111. 246, 65 N. E. (2d) 805 (1946).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, §§ 23-5, 23-70, 23-72, 23-81, 23-83, 23-105,
and 23--106.
32
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Fundamental problems in the field of public law were considered in People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 5 which decision
upheld the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act.8 6 The court indicated that the fact that the Authority was
given no power to levy taxes for any of its corporate purposes did
not prevent it from being a municipal corporation as the power to
tax was not a necessary incident thereto. It was also claimed that,
as the transit authority would be given the use of certain cityowned subways, a violation of a constitutional provision, forbidding a municipal corporation from loaning its credit to a" railroad
or private corporation, 8 7 had occurred. Upon finding that the
authority was neither a "railroad" nor a "private corporation,"
the court concluded that no violation had occurred.
8 the court upheld Section
In Hansen v. Raleigh,3
1-13 of the
Cities and Villages Act which exempts a member of a municipal
fire department from liability for damages "caused by him while
operating a motor vehicle while engaged in the performance of his
duties as a fireman. "39 The court indicated that the statute constituted a proper subject for legislative classification, but limited
its operating by denying that it extended to cover a fireman on his
way to a fire as an "observer" for the purpose of gaining knowledge for fire-fighting methods.

One other case might bear mention. In People ex rel. Schlaeger
v. Bunge Bros. Coal Company,40 the court held that the appropriation by a municipality of a modest sum for dues in an organization
composed of city mayors constituted a proper public expenditure
because of the benefit derived by the city. The purchase of works
of art created by local talent, however, was held an improper
expenditure as the court said it was "difficult to see therein a
4
public purpose." 1
35392 Ill.77, 64 N. E. (2d) 4 (1945).
.6Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 1112A, § 301 et seq.
37 Il. Const./1870, Art. XIV, § 2.
38391 Ill.536, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvrnw 257.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 1-13.
40392 Ill. 153, 64 N. E. (2d) 365 (1946).
4i 392 Ill. 153 at 168, 64 N. E. (2d) 365 at 371.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES

Another phase of Chicago 's complicated transportation situation reached the Supreme Court this past year through the case of
Sprague v. Biggs42 in which direct appeal was taken from an order
dismissing a suit to enjoin the members of the Illinois Commerce
Commission from enforcing certain orders which it had entered
denying certain temporary increases in fares. The trustees of the
transportation system took the position that the orders in question
deprived them of property without due process of law because the
enforcement thereof would amount to a confiscation of the property. The court held, on the merits, that the trustees were not
receiving reasonable compensation as the revenue was insufficient
to meet operating expenses, but said that the trustees had not
presented a case upon which a rate base providing for a proper
return on investment could be determined. The case was, accordingly, reversed and remanded.
Several contentions which were collateral to the merits of
the case, however, presented questions of interest. In the first
place, the defendants claimed that the trustees were merely seeking
a review of the decision of the Commission; that this simply called
for a reweighing of the evidence presented to it; that the procedure
for such a review was set out in the Public Utilities Act; and that
this established procedure for review had not been followed.
Answering this contention, the court said:
.... situations may arise in rate cases before the commission
where the procedure to be followed under the Public Utilities
Act does not furnish a utility full and adequate means to
prevent the actions of the commission in reference to rates
from violating constitutional rights. Under these circumstances, a court of equity takes jurisdiction to prevent the
utility suffering irreparable loss and injury. The equity
action is a trial de novo and is independent of the proceeding
pending before the commission. There may be questions of
fact which are common to both cases and the decisions to be
42

390 Ill. 537, 62 N. E. (2d) 420 (1945).
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made may relate to the same subject matter, but on the issues
raised and the matter of proof to be followed in the equity
case, they are to be considered as separate and distinct actions.
The opinions in some of the cases indicate that the evidence
introduced before the commission was placed in evidence in
the equity suit, but it cannot be said that such procedure is
43
essential in all cases to the maintenance of the equity action.
The defendants also pointed out that some of the franchises
of the transit company had expired; that many more were about
to expire; that the trustees, therefore, should be considered merely
as "tenants at sufferance," and that, as such, they were in no position to invoke the constitutional right to make a fair rate of return
or even to avoid a loss. The court observed, however, that the
municipality had made no reference in its answer to these facts
nor did it mention the same in its brief. Pointing out that the
power of a city to grant franchises to a utility had to be distinguished from the power delegated by the legislature to the
Commission to regulate the rates of utilities, the court concluded:
The proceedings before the commission in this suit are on the
assumption that the property held by the trustees is going to
continue to render service as a utility, and that the city will
continue to permit the use of parts of its streets. The orders
of the commission are on the basis that the utility will continue to furnish transportation to the public. Under such
circumstances, the property of the utility must be considered
as devoted to a public utility and during the continuance of
such use the trustees have the right to be compensated for
the services it renders. We perceive no reason why the
trustees operating a public utility under the circumstances
shown would not be entitled to invoke the constitutional requirements of due process. 44
The defendants finally urged that, even if the expiration of
the franchise did not prohibit the trustees from claiming confiscaIll. 537 at 546, 62 N. E. (2d) 420 at 425.
44 390 Ill. 537 at 550, 62 N. E. (2d) 420 at 426-7.
43'390
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tion, at least the expiration would render the property which was
located in the streets valueless except for "scrap."
For support
in denying this contention, the court relied upon City and County
of Denver v. Denver Union Water Company45 and Iowa City v.Iowa City Light & Power Company." In the first of these cases, it
was said: "It involves a practical contradiction of terms to say
that property useful and actually used in a public service is not
to be estimated as having the value of property in use, but is to
be reckoned with on the basis of its 'junk value.' )147
TAXATION

In People ex rel. Prindable v. Union Electric Power Company,4 the Supreme Court resurveyed the entire Illinois law
upon the question of the interpretation and application of Section
1 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution 4 9 to the problem of
assessment of capital stock taxes, overruling its earlier decision
in People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Railroad Company.50
The question presented is succinctly stated by the court in quoting
from the appellant's, i.e. taxpayer's brief, as follows:
The question for decision in this case is clear cut. Appellant
was charged with taxes for the year 1943 extended against
54% of the full fair cash value of its capital stock as determined by the Department of Revenue. All real estate and
personal property located in the county of St. Clair and in the
taxing district in which appellant's principal office is located,
and all corporations whose capital stock was subject to assess45 246 U. S. 178, 38 S. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649 (1918).
46 90 F. (2d) 679 (1937).
47246 U. S. 178 at 191, 38 S. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649 at 661.
48392 Ill. 271, 64 N. E. (2d) 534 (1946).

49Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 1, declares: "The general assembly shall provide
such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or
its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons. to be
elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and
not otherwise; but the general assembly shall have power to tax . . . persons or
corporations owning or using franchises and privileges, in such manner as it
shall from time to time direct by general law, uniform as to the class upon
which it operates."
50327 Ill. 493, 192 N. E. 645 (1934).
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ment by the local assessing officers, have been required to pay
taxes extended against 35% only of the full fair cash value of
such property.51
The position of the appellant, which, in general; the McDonough
case would seem to support, was that Section 1 of Article IX
prescribes, throughout its length and breadth, the imposition of
an ad valorem property tax implicitly requiring substantial equality in the level of assessment. The court, however, in a well
considered opinion which would seem to indicate in general a
liberalization of the court's attitude toward the limitations imposed by Section 1, held that while the general plan of uniformity
is required to be applied to both clauses of Section 1, that it need
not be applied as between the two clauses themselves but only
within the scope and limit of each clause individually.
While the provision interpreted is susceptible of this construction, it has generally been supposed that the first clause
authorized the imposition of property taxes and imposed an absolute ad valorem requirement with reference thereto, and that the
second clause authorized the imposition of excise taxes and required only uniformity within the particular class with reference
to the assessment thereof. The opinion of the court will bear
careful reading and study, containing as it does an interesting
gloss in shifted and shifting emphasis upon certain leading Illinois
tax cases.
An interesting problem is presented in People ex rel. Sanitary
District of Chicago v. Schlaeger 52 with respect to another section
of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, one which prohibits the
general assembly from imposing upon municipal corporations or
their inhabitants or property any taxes for corporate purposes.5 3
51392 Ill. 271 at 273, 64 N. E. (2d)

534 at 535.
391 Ill. 314, 63 N. E. (2d) 382 (1945).
53 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 10, states:
"The general assembly shall not impose taxes upon municipal corporations or the inhabitants or property thereof,
for corporate purposes, but shall require that all the taxable property within
the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law, such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons
and property, within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. Private
property shall not be liable to be taken or sold for the payment of the corporate
debts of a municipal corporation."
52
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Section 16-2 of the Election Code,5 4 providing for the apportionment among municipalities of the expense of elections, was attacked as being within the prohibition of that constitutional provision. In sustaining the validity of the section of the Election
Code, the court conceded that the imposition upon a municipality
of a debt which would have to be paid out of general taxes would
be as vulnerable to attack under the constitutional prohibition as
would the imposition of the tax itself, but held that in this instance
the state had imposed upon the municipalities in question the duty
of performing certain "state" as distinguished from "local"
functions, which it had a right to do, and that hence the liability
imposed by the provision was not one for "corporate" purposes
but rather for state purposes.
Although questions arising under the Unemployment Compensation Act 5" do not technically belong in the field of taxation,
the practice heretofore established of treating such matters with
taxation cases will be followed. Several cases are deemed worthy
of mention, either upon a basis of general interest or of actual
legal significance. In American Medical Association v. Board of
Review of Department of Labor,5" for example, the Supreme
Court held the association subject to the Unemployment Compensation Act. It had sought exemption under the provisions of
Section 2(f) (6) (G), which directs that the term "employment"
shall not include service performed in the employment of a corporation "organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable,
scientific, . . . or educational purposes . . . no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual. 'I" It was conceded that the association was "organized" for charitable, scientific and educational purposes but
the court failed to find that it had been operated "exclusively"
for such purposes. The court called particular attention to the
fact that the association devoted a substantial portion of its assets
and its income toward protecting and furthering economic benefits
Ill.Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 46, § 16--2.
Ibid., Ch. 48, § 217 et seq.
56 392 Il. 614, 65 N. E. (2d) 350 (1946).
57 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 218.
54
55
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to. its individual members; that it maintained and operated a
bureau for printing and issuing to its membership information as
to fees and payment for medical services, and a bureau providing
financial status of patients and information as to collection and
accounts, and concluded that these were not activities which made
for or assisted in the primary proposition of a scientific or educational association. It may be interesting to note in this connection
that an organization may fall within the exemption claimed even
though certain of its income or activities are not of themselves
derived from scientific or educational purposes, but where such
income or activities are, nevertheless, expended for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes. 58
At least two more cases can be added to the string of
employee-independent contractor cases. In Aluminum, Cooking
Utensil Company v. Gordon, 9 the court held to be an independent
contractor a distributor of kitchen utensils operating under a
written contract, performing work in a given territory, reporting
progress of the work, using such'hours as he chose, and being paid
commissions, the contract not specifying any control of the performance of the work but retaining only the right to require
minimum sales, the services being "performed outside all of the
places of business of the enterprise for which such service is
performed," and there being nothing in the contract to preclude
engagement in another business in conjunction therewith. Although the contract was so carefully drawn that one cannot quarrel
with the result reached, nevertheless, it is a little difficult to
perceive very much distinction between this case and Murphy v.
Daumit,60 the vacuum cleaner salesman case, as well as certain
61
other similar decisions rendered by the court in recent years.
The court cited in support of its decision an earlier case
falling within the scope of this survey, that of John Gabel Manufacturing Company v. Murphy. 2 It must be conceded that the
58 People v. Young Men's Christian Association, 365 Il1.
(1937).
59 393 Ill. 542, 66 N. E. (2d) 431 (1946).
60 387 Ill. 406, 56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944).

118, 6 N. E. (2d)

166

61 See a number of similar cases noted in 24 CmICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 89-91.

62 390 I1. 455, 62 N. E. (2d) 401 (1945), noted in 34 I1. B. J. 267, Thompson,
J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Smith, J., also dissented.
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doctrine of the Aluminum Utensil case does not, in ingenuity at
least, go beyond the Gabel case. In the latter case the appellant,
resisting liability, owned and formerly had serviced a great number of automatic vending machines and automatic phonographs,
through its employees. Several elaborate arrangements were
entered into, beginning in 1938, under which the former salesmen
and service men emerged first as partners operating under a
leasing arrangement with the appellant and subsequently as independent lessees of the machines. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions therein offer an interesting study in relationship of substance and form in the drafting of contracts and the application
of legislative provisions.
Another case involving the Unemployment Compensation Act,
at least collaterally, may be mentioned here. In People v. Chicago
Waste & Textile Company,68 the Illinois Supreme Court, with the
approval of the United States Supreme Court,6 4 rejected a somewhat tenuous but rather ingenious argument, designed to except
from the operation of Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes,6"
concerning liability to the State of Illinois under the Unemployment Compensation Act. The federal statute establishes a priority
for debts due the United States against the assets of an insolvent.
The basic controversy was one of priority with respect to taxes
levied under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and federal
insurance contributions under the Social Security Act, on the one
hand, and liability under the Unemployment Compensation Act of
Illinois, on the other. The argument advanced by the State of
Illinois and approved by the trial court, but rejected by the Illinois
and -United States Supreme Courts, was predicated upon the
assumption that the general framework and underlying philosophy
of the social security legislation was intended to create an exception pro tanto. Both Supreme courts expressed an unwillingness
to find an implied exception to the operation of "so clear a command" as that contained in Section 3466 of the federal statute.
63 391 Ill. 29, 62 N. E. (2d) 537 (1945).
64U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 841, 90 L. Ed. (adv.)
631 U. S. C. A. § 191.
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In the only case of interest in this field during the judicial
year, the federal district court affirmed the doctrine announced in
Lady Esther, Limited v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 66 by
holding that the defendant in Elastic Stop Nut Corporation of
America v. Greer 7 was guilty of unfair competition, although
there was no proof of specific instances of palming off, where it
was established that the trade generally was confused by what
the defendant did into thinking that the product of the defendant
was the product of the plaintiff. The court said, "It is sufficient
to warrant injunctive relief if there is the likelihood of confusion
in the trade." 6 " The facts argued for the soundness of the court's
position. The plaintiff therein was a manufacturer of selflocking nuts which it designated as "Elastic Stop Nuts" and
"Stop Nuts." To provide visual identification for its product,
the plaintiff used a red fiber for the insert by which the nut was
locked on the bolt. The natural color of the fiber was gray.
Based on this, it-advertised its product as "nuts with the red
collar."
The defendant undertook to manufacture a substantially identical product. He used a fiber of identical red, asserted
to the trade that his products could be "identified by the red
center" and referred to his products as "Elastic Stop Nuts" and
"Stop Nuts." The similarity was so pronounced that the tendency to provoke a "confusion in the trade" was readily apparent.
VIII. TORTS
Two defamation cases have evoked some interest. In Life
Printing & Publishing Company, Inc. v. Field,1 the Appellate
Court indicated that a corporation can complain of libel only if
the defamatory matter assails its financial position, its business
methods, or accuses it of fraud or mismanagement. Since no
66317 I1.

App. 451, 46 N. E. (2d) 165 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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486, 64 N. E. (2d) 383 (1946). See also a companion case reApp. 254, 58 N. E. (2d) 307 (1944).

